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Benchmark concentration: capitalization weights versus equal weights in the 
FTSE 100 Index 
Abstract  
Identifying a suitable benchmark is essential when testing asset pricing models, measuring the 
performance of active investors, or providing market proxy portfolios for passive investors. Concern that 
increased domination of capitalization weighted stock indices by a few large firms will lead to inefficient 
portfolio diversification is leading some investors and researchers to argue that index providers should 
adjust their weighting methods to limit concentration. This study tests and rejects the hypothesis that 
concentration arising as a result of capitalization weights in the FTSE 100 Index increases risk, either 
during normal market conditions or during negative tail events in the return distribution. On the contrary, 
during the left tail of the return distribution, the equally weighted portfolio of FTSE 100 Index 
constituents exhibits higher risk and lower returns than the capitalization weighted FTSE 100 Index 
portfolio, a finding consistent with variations of the CAPM that allow for time varying risk premia. 
 
I . INTRODUCTION 
Stock Indices are used as benchmarks for testing asset pricing models and by investors to gauge 
the performance of the market. They are also important as model portfolios for passive investors and as 
benchmarks against which the added value or alpha of active investors can be measured. The 
characteristics of a good benchmark portfolio are defined comprehensively by Bailey (1992). These 
include the requirement to be transparent, unambiguous, easy to replicate and measurable. However, a 
forthcoming paper by Ranaldo and Haberle (2007) argues that many supposedly passive benchmark 
portfolios represented by major Indices, such as the S&P 500 and FTSE 100, actually have more in 
common with an actively managed portfolio than a passive benchmark, or proxy for their respective 
sections of the market portfolio.   
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) capitalization weights provide the most 
theoretically appealing method for calculating market benchmark indices. This is because investors are 
assumed to create mean variance efficient portfolios based upon their expectations about returns, 
variance and covariance. Hence, in an efficient market, capitalization weights of the market index 
represent the average of investors’ attempts to capture the benefits of modern portfolio theory (MPT) as 
defined by Markowitz (1952). In fact, according to the CAPM, an equally weighted index, or indeed any 
non capitalization weighted index, should be less efficient and hence, have lower risk adjusted returns. 
Although studies such as Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997) and others pose a challenge to the 
traditional CAPM, later extensions to the CAPM, such as the scaled consumption ratio (C)CAPM of 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), which allows for time varying market risk premia, address much of that 
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challenge. Likewise, it is often observed that the equally weighted market index of the Chicago Centre 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) outperforms the capitalization weighted CRSP index. Yet, as 
early as 1982, this out-performance was demonstrated to be unstable if the β coefficient of the CAPM 
regression was allowed to vary stochastically through time (Ohlson & Rosenberg 1982). Indeed the sign 
of the intercept was found to be dependent upon the stochastic model specified for the β coefficient 
(Ohlson & Rosenberg 1982). Notwithstanding the theoretical underpinning for capitalization weighted 
indices, high levels of firm and industry level concentration in major market indices, such as the FTSE 
100 Index and the Nasdaq Composite, have led some to question the merits of capitalization weighting. 
For example, Arnott, Xu and Moore (2005 p 93) express concerns to the effect that   
“…through the 1962 – 2004 period; we experienced bubbles in which cap weighting caused 
severe destruction of investor wealth…”  
Instead of capitalization weights, Arnott, Xu, and Moore (2005) propose a fundamental weighting system 
based on variables such as the net earnings, number of employees and total sales of index constituent 
firms. Capitalization weights have also caused problems for institutional investors that face regulatory 
limits on the proportion of assets invested in any one firm. An issue that prompted FTSE International to 
prepare an alternative version of the FTSE 100 and FTSE Allshare Index in which constituent weights 
are capped at 5% to, “allow for a more diversified index”, while Merrill Lynch Investment Management 
created an equally weighted version of the FTSE 100 as a benchmark because it, “should show lower 
volatility, thanks to better diversification” (Financial Times 2000).   
Much of the concern voiced about stock market, and index, concentration stems from the naive 
diversification principles of Evans and Archer (1968), namely that investors should spread their portfolio 
between eight to ten randomly selected firms to reduce stock specific risk. A study by Bloomfield, 
Leftwich, and Long (1977) raised the number to around twenty firms. This then increased to between 
fifty and one hundred (Campbell et al 2001), and to more than three hundred (Statman 2004). 
Kryzanowski and Singh (2006) find that the minimum number of firms needed to reduce most of the 
stock specific risk in a portfolio is higher for the Canadian equity market than for the US equity market. 
They suggest that the difference is due to the presence of a greater number of imperfectly correlated 
industries in the US market; thereby highlighting the importance of covariance, rather than firm numbers, 
in determining the structure of an efficiently diversified portfolio.  
Proposals for capped weights, equal weights, or fundamental weights seem to be a direct 
challenge to the theoretical arguments supporting the CAPM and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
(EMH).  Furthermore, non capitalization weighted indices are less likely to meet the criteria of a suitable 
benchmark, as defined by Bailey et al (1992) or Ranaldo and Haberle (2007). For instance, the greater 
frequency of re-balancing required to maintain capped or equal weights will result in higher portfolio 
transaction costs, thus reducing their investability.     
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Compared to capitalization weighted benchmarks, returns of an equally weighted benchmark are 
likely to be influenced more by smaller firms. Therefore, counter to the theoretical principles of the 
CAPM, empirical evidence for the small firm effect supports the prediction that broad benchmark indices 
with capped or equal weights are likely to have higher market risk adjusted returns than capitalization 
weighted portfolios of the same constituents. However, indices such as the FTSE 100 are restricted to 
large firms and their constituents often account for less than 10% of the total number of firms listed on 
their respective exchanges. Hence, even allowing for the possibility that the small firm effect cannot be 
explained by CAPM variations incorporating time varying risk premia, or time varying β coefficients, the 
small firm effect should still not be a factor driving the returns of an equally weighted constituent 
portfolio of a large firm index.     
Although large firm indices have a relatively small number of constituents, compared to the total 
listed, they usually account for considerably more than 50% of the capitalization of their respective 
markets.  Thus the constituents of large firm indices are more liquid, more investable and, arguably, more 
economically relevant than those of small firm indices. Nonetheless, within many large firm indices, the 
degree of concentration is such that considerable variation in relative firm size exists between 
constituents. For example, on the 31st December 2004, the largest firm in the FTSE 100 Index, BP, was 
one hundred and twenty-three times larger than the smallest, Antofagasta. Tables 1 and 2 provide more 
general evidence related to this point. The objective of this study is to investigate whether concentration 
in a large firm index such as the FTSE 100 does indeed increase risk without increasing returns, as 
suggested by authors such as Arnott, Xu, and Moore (2005) and some professional investors, or whether 
on the contrary, a concentrated capitalization weighted index actually outperforms the non concentrated 
equally weighted index, as implied by the CAPM and similar models. 
II . DERIVATION AND SELECTION OF THE DATA SAMPLE  
This study focuses on a large firm index, the FTSE 100, thereby eliminating the confounding 
effect of a potential small firm premium.  It empirically investigates whether the equally weighted 
portfolio of FTSE 100 Index constituents underperforms the capitalization weighted FTSE 100 Index as 
suggested by the CAPM, after accounting for the market risk factor implicit in the capitalization 
weighted FTSE 100 Index returns. Furthermore, it examines the sensitivity of an equally weighted 
portfolio of FTSE 100 Index constituents to the capitalization weighted FTSE 100 Index during the lower 
tail of the FTSE 100 Index return distribution and during the upper tail of the earnings yield of the FTSE 
100 Index, the upper tail of the term premium of ten year government bonds over three month treasury 
bills and the upper tail of the default premium of benchmark corporate bond yields over ten year 
government bond yields.   
In a time series study of stock index concentration it is necessary to measure the weights of 
constituent firms in order to measure the concentration of an index portfolio. Therefore, the choice of 
index is limited by the availability of data identifying not only current constituents but historic index 
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constituents and the original base constituents. These conditions are necessary in order to allow 
recreation of the historic index portfolio enabling historic levels of concentration to be evaluated using 
financial databases, such as Thomson Financial Datastream. As a capitalization weighted index of the 
100 largest firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, the FTSE 100 Index meets all of the above 
criteria. Unlike more comprehensive market Indices, such as the FTSE All Share Index, the original 
constituent list together with the names and dates of subsequent additions and deletions are publicly 
available from inception in January 1984 through to the present. In addition, the constituent selection 
procedures and calculation methods are more transparent than those of competing index providers. 
Furthermore, the concentration of the FTSE 100 Index increased, and by some measures doubled, over 
the last ten years, to the extent that at the time of writing more than 50% of the index value is accounted 
for by the ten largest firms.  These characteristics combined with the depth and liquidity of the 
constituents, and size of the London Stock Exchange as a whole, justify the selection of the FTSE 100 for 
this study.   
The FTSE 100 Constituents list is updated quarterly based on the capitalization ranking of firms 
with a primary listing on the UK market. However, constituent changes may take place within quarters if 
mergers, de-listings, or new listings, result in potential constituents being deleted or created. Further 
details are provided in the Guide to Calculation Methods for the UK Series of the FTSE Actuaries Share 
Indices. From September 20th 2000, FTSE International began to phase in a free float adjusted weighting 
method. The analysis presented here is based upon a recreation of the Index using the original weighting 
method until the 20th September 2000 and the free float adjusted method post September 2000. Analysis 
was also performed using unadjusted weights throughout; however, the results were not materially 
different from those presented here because firms with the greatest weight in the index had a free float of 
100%. 
Concentration 
A key feature of the analysis is the idea that an index of concentration or diversity can be used to 
measure the distribution of constituent weights within a stock index portfolio. Based on the analysis of a 
range of different concentration metrics by Clarke (1993), the Hirschman Herfindahl Index (H) of 
concentration and the variance of the logarithm of firm size are calculated using the equity market values 
of FTSE 100 constituents.  
Values of the H index are calculated at twenty trading day intervals as follows: 
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where wi is the weight of an individual company in a sample, xi is the value of firm i and x is the total 
value of all N firms. The H index is influenced more by the biggest firms in a portfolio as it is the sum of 
the squared weights of all the portfolio firms. H has an upper limit of unity in the hypothetical scenario in 
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which the entire market is represented by just one firm. It has a minimum value of  in the case 
of many small equally sized firms.   
0/1 →N
In the situation where firm values have an approximately log normal distribution, the variance of 
the logarithm of firm weights (V2) provides an unambiguous ranking of firm size inequality (Clarke 
1993). The distribution of FTSE 100 Index constituent firm size and firm weights was found to be 
approximately log-normal; therefore, daily values of the variance of the logarithms of firm weights 
sampled at twenty trading day intervals are calculated as follows:  
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where gw  is equal to the geometric mean of firm weights.        
A range of other concentration metrics were also calculated for the FTSE 100 Index constituents. 
However, the time series path of many of these appeared very similar to the H index, which is influenced 
relatively more by large firms. An exception is the V2 index that is influenced by a more even range of 
firm sizes in the distribution. Therefore, the decision was made to report only the H index and the V2 
index. The latter adds value to the analysis by confirming that concentration has increased over time, 
regardless of which part of the firm size distribution is emphasised. 
Capitalization weighted FTSE 100 Index and equally weighted constituent portfolio returns 
The Datastream Total Return Index and market value data for all FTSE 100 Index constituents 
past and present are used to calculate the dividend-inclusive geometric returns for the FTSE 100 Index 
constituents over the entire study period. Geometric equally weighted and capitalization weighted returns 
are used to calculate FTSE 100 Index portfolio returns and the returns of the equally weighted portfolio 
of constituents. However, once the cross section of constituent returns is aggregated to form the 
respective index, or portfolio, they are then converted to logarithmic returns for time series analysis. The 
incremental return is defined as the capitalization weighted return minus the equally weighted return. 
Incremental standard deviation 
None-overlapping monthly data for the realised capitalization weighted and equally weighted 
monthly variance are derived by taking the sum of squared daily value and equally weighted returns over 
twenty trading days. The assumption of an expected return of zero for estimating realised volatility was 
proposed by Figlewski (1997) and has been adopted more recently by Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003). 
When equity returns are measured at daily frequencies, or less, a mean return of zero is a reasonable 
assumption, given that the realised variance over periods of up to one month is large in relation to 
estimates of the mean return. The square roots of each variance series then proxy as the realised 
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capitalization and equally weighted monthly standard deviations. The incremental standard deviation is 
defined as the capitalization weighted standard deviation minus the equally weighted standard deviation. 
III . RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Concentration in the FTSE 100 Index 
Figure I, plots the levels of both the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index and the Variance of the 
Logarithm of Firm Size. From 1997 onwards, concentration increased rapidly with a jump in March 2000 
when there was a structural break resulting from the Vodafone-Mannessmann merger event, after which 
concentration levels remained high until the end of the study period.  
Figure II indicates that relatively low levels of concentration observable in figure I during the 
early to the mid 1990s correspond with the fall in the number of mergers and an increase in the number 
of divestitures. The rapid increase in concentration in the late 1990s coincided with an increase in the 
value of both domestic and foreign mergers. Throughout the 1980s, both before and after the 1987 crash, 
the number and value of mergers between UK firms increased to a peak in 1989. However, figure II also 
reveals that the recession of the early 1990s was characterised by a fall in the number of mergers and an 
increase in the number of divestitures resulting in a trend towards more ‘focussed’ firms. Unlike earlier 
merger waves aimed at the formation of conglomerates, many of the mergers in the 1990s resulted in the 
creation of multinational firms via horizontal mergers within the same industry. Pharmaceuticals, 
telecommunications, software development and oil production were notable examples of consolidating 
industries in this period. The increased importance of international mergers is evident from the greater 
percentage of the total value of mergers accounted for by foreign firms through much of the 1990s, apart 
from the dips in 1995 and 1996, which are followed by a rise to the peak in 1999. Examples include the 
merger of BP with Amoco Oil, Vodafone with Mannesmann and Glaxo-Welcome with Smith-Kline and 
Beecham to form Glaxo-Smithkline. These firms have expanded overseas to such an extent that the 
majority of their revenues are now generated outside of the UK. In fact, Orton (2001) cites Michael 
Hughes of Baring Asset Management 
"More than half of the constituents of the FTSE 100 Index,.....now derive the majority of their 
earnings from international activities."   
Examination of the financial statements of the larger index constituent firms provides plenty of 
supporting evidence for the above statement. Thus, while there are over seven hundred firms listed on the 
main section of the London market, excluding closed ended investment companies, the majority of the 
equity market capitalization is accounted for by fewer than twenty large global industry leaders. 
Descriptive statistics of the data series 
Incremental returns and standard deviations arise as a result of concentration of capitalization 
weights in the index. Positive incremental returns indicate that the capitalization weighted FTSE 100 
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Index portfolio return is greater than the equally weighted portfolio of constituents, while negative values 
of the incremental standard deviation indicate that the capitalization weighted portfolio returns are less 
variable than their equally weighted counterparts.   
Panel A. of table 3, reports the descriptive statistics for the annualised discrete non-overlapping 
sequences of monthly return and volatility data. It is immediately apparent that none of the data series 
conform to the characteristics of a normal distribution because they all exhibit skewness and kurtosis 
values outside the defining range of the Jarque-Bera Test. Although the mean and median standard 
deviation is higher in the capitalization weighed index than in the equally weighted portfolio, both the 
maximum and minimum values of the standard deviations are lower, as are the skewness and kurtosis, 
indicating that during conditions of market stress, the variability of the capitalization weighted portfolio 
increases by less than that of the equally weighted portfolio. At 0.1 and 0.2 standard deviations from 
zero, respectively, the annualised mean and median of the incremental standard deviation indicates that 
for the majority of the time, the capitalization weighted FTSE 100 Index portfolio is not significantly 
more risky than the equally weighted portfolio.   
Both the mean and the median annualised incremental returns are positive at 3.9% and 2.34% 
respectively. The maximum value is an annualised contribution of 146% to total portfolio return, while 
the minimum is – 37%.  This is 30 and 8 standard deviations away from zero respectively. This is 
significant at a level of α < 1% under most known probability distributions and under Chebyshev’s 
inequality.  Taken together with the positive skewness this indicates that during extreme market 
conditions, the contribution of the incremental return to the total FTSE 100 Index returns are larger 
during positive extremes than they are during negative extremes.  These findings imply that very large 
firms with a greater weight in the index have higher returns on average than the smaller firms and that 
their returns are less volatile during periods of market crisis. The lower volatility is not entirely surprising 
given that many large firms are multinationals with more diverse revenue streams than their smaller 
counterparts.  It should be noted that smaller firms in the FTSE 100 Index are still large firms when 
compared to the market as a whole and that for much of the 1990s large growth firms out-performed 
small value firms reversing the small firm value premium documented in many studies published during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s (Dimson, Nagel, and Quigley 2003). 
Implications for asset pricing theories 
A capitalization weighted index would be expected to perform better during market downturns 
than an equally weighted index if it is assumed that large firms have lower systematic risk than smaller 
firms. Furthermore, if investors’ marginal utility increases during bad times of the economy, the required 
return will increase on all risky assets and prices will fall to reflect the new equilibrium discount rate. 
However, the discount rate on riskier assets with high market β coefficients will increase by more than 
the required return on less risky assets. Therefore, the prices of the high β stocks will fall further than 
those with a lower β and further than would be implied by their β for a similar market fall if the risk 
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premium had remained unchanged. The result is that the observed systematic risk of stocks with a β 
greater than unity appears to be time varying and increasing when market returns are negative.1 An 
alternative explanation with similar results is to allow for the possibility of time varying market risk, as 
identified empirically by Schwert (1989) and other studies. In this case, during times of greater 
uncertainty, investors will require higher returns in order to compensate them for the greater levels of 
risk. As security prices collectively fall to reflect the new equilibrium rate of return the observed 
correlations between individual security returns will appear to rise, as will their average β coefficients 
with the market return, also giving the impression that the β coefficients of individual securities are time 
varying.  
Model I aims to test the hypothesis that the sensitivity of the equally weighted returns to the 
capitalization weighted returns increases during bad times. Such a finding would be expected if marginal 
utility increases during bad times, or if market risk increases during bad times. Thus model I formally 
tests the relationships between equally weighted portfolio returns and the value weighted FTSE 100 
Index portfolio that are indicated by descriptive statistics of the raw unconditional data presented in panel 
A of table 3.  
Even if the risk premium is constant, during periods of declining or negative expected growth in 
corporate profitability, stock prices will fall relative to current profits and the trailing earnings yield will 
rise, reflecting the increase in the applied discount rate as the impact of the growth rate on reducing the 
denominator of the present value equation is reversed. Likewise, term premiums are expected to be 
positive when the economic outlook is improving, because future interest rates are more likely to rise 
than to fall, although during times of extreme market crisis this may be reversed as investors try to exit 
less liquid assets in favour of cash. Default premiums are higher during economic downturns to reflect 
the increased probability of bankruptcy and default. Hence for the purpose of model I higher than usual 
market β coefficients are expected to coincide with below average equity market returns, above average 
trailing market earnings yields, below average term premiums and above average default premiums.  
Model I specification 
+−+−+−+=− )()()( 2211 tVWtVWtVWtEWt rfRDrfRDrfRrfR ttt λλβα  (I) 
ttEWttVWtVW rfRrfRDrfRD tt εδλλ +−+−+− −− )()()( 114433  
REWt is the return of the equally weighted portfolio of FTSE 100 Index constituents during month t, rft is 
the return on one-month UK treasury-bills during month t (Thomson Financial Datastream code 
LDNTB1M), λ1 to λ4 are interaction coefficients with β and the interaction dummies D1 to D4. D1 is an 
interaction dummy variable equal to unity in months when the capitalization weighted FTSE 100 Index 
experienced a total excess return over one-month treasury bills of 0.85 standard deviations or more below 
the mean observed during the study period. If the return distribution is normal this would approximate to 
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the bottom quintile of monthly returns. D2 is an interaction dummy variable equal to unity when the 
trailing earnings yield on the FTSE 100 Index (calculated by taking the reciprocal of the FTSE100 Index 
PE ratio) is more than 0.85 standard deviations above the mean value observed during the study period. 
D3 is an interaction dummy variable equal to unity when the term premium, of the ten year Benchmark 
Government Bond yield (Thomson Financial Datastream code UKMGLTB) above the one month UK 
Treasury-Bill yield, is more than 0.85 standard deviations above the average observed during the study 
period. D4 is an interaction dummy variable equal to unity when the default premium, of the Benchmark 
UK Corporate Bond yield (Thomson Financial Datastream code UKMCRPB) above the ten-year 
Benchmark Government Bond yield, is more than 0.85 standard deviations above the average default 
premium observed during the study period. The model results did in fact seem largely insensitive to the 
choice of cutoff point for the three dummy variables with ranges between 0 and 3 standard deviations 
tested. Furthermore, alternative model specifications using the raw earnings yield, term and default 
premiums where also tried without materially affecting the results from those reported. Correlations 
between dummy variables are negligible, unlike between alternative valuation ratios such as earnings 
yield, dividend yield and book to market ratio, hence the decision to use only one valuation ratio 
(Earnings Yield) in the reported model results. 
Model I hypotheses 
H1 – Relative returns of the equally weighted versus value weighted portfolio 
According to the CAPM and the EMH, a market proxy portfolio that is equally weighted, or 
constructed using any non capitalization based weighting scheme, will have inferior risk adjusted returns 
compared to the capitalization weighted equivalent. Hence, as model I aims to explain the relationship 
between the returns of a non-capitalization weighted portfolio with the capitalization weighted FTSE 100 
Index portfolio, the intercept coefficient α is expected to be negative and statistically significant, as it is 
indeed reported in panel B of table 3.   
The small firm effect widely documented by empirical studies is not explained by the CAPM. 
The results reported here appear more consistent with the CAPM than with the small firm effect.  
However, even if we allow for the existence of the small firm effect, the results are still not surprising 
given that although the FTSE 100 Index accounts for more than 80% of the UK market by capitalization, 
it accounts for less than 20% of the total number of firms listed on the Main Market of London Stock 
Exchange, meaning that it is essentially a portfolio of the largest and most liquid firms.     
H2 – Average β coefficients of portfolio constituents to the market risk factor 
According to the traditional CAPM, individual security returns are linearly related to market 
returns and the average β coefficient across all securities to the market, or the market proxy portfolio will 
not be significantly different from unity, as is indicated by the empirically estimated coefficient β 
reported for model I in panel B of table 3, during normal market conditions.   
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In addition to assuming a linear relationship between individual security returns and the market 
returns, the traditional CAPM assumes that market risk and the market risk premium is constant. If this is 
true, there should be no interaction between the sign of market returns, earnings yield, term premium 
default premium and the β coefficient in model II. However, although the coefficients λ3 and λ4 on the 
interaction dummies D3 and D4 are reported in panel B of table 3 as not significantly different from zero, 
the coefficients λ1 and λ2 on interaction dummies D1 and D2 are positive and significantly different from 
zero, implying that in the bottom quintile of market monthly returns, and the top quintile of monthly 
trailing earnings yield, the β slope coefficient increases above unity when it is added to the interaction 
dummy coefficients λ1 and λ2. 
The positive interaction dummy coefficients λ1 and λ2 suggest that during market downturns, the 
covariance of less large stocks with the returns of the capitalization weighted portfolio increases.  Hence 
the β coefficient with the market portfolio which is close to unity during normal market conditions 
actually exceeds unity during times of market stress, implying that the equally weighted portfolio is 
riskier than the capitalization weighted portfolio and is likely to suffer larger negative returns during 
periods of market stress.  The findings are not inconsistent with other studies which allow for a time 
varying risk premium or a time varying β coefficients, such as Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Ohlson 
and Rosenberg (1982) respectively.  
Model II repeats the process carried out by model I for the relationship between changes in 
concentration and the FTSE 100 index returns.  
Model II specification 
+−+−+−+=∆ )()()( 2211 tVWtVWtVWt rfRDrfRDrfRC ttt λλβα  (II) 
tttVWtVW CrfRDrfRD tt εδλλ +∆+−+− −14433 )()(  
In model II, ∆Ct is the change in concentration at time t, defined as the differenced Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index in model IIa and the differenced Variance of the Logarithm of Firm Size in model IIb, other 
variables are as for model I. 
Model II hypotheses 
H3 – Firm size and concentration 
If small firms have higher market β coefficients than large firms, then during times of market stress, 
small firms will fall further relative to large firms and concentration will increase, whereas under normal 
market conditions it is difficult to anticipate what effect, if any, changes in market returns will have on 
portfolio concentration.  The results of model IIa presented in panel B of table 3, document a positive 
empirical association between market returns and changes in concentration during normal market 
conditions which is significant at the α < 10% level. However, the λ1 and λ2 coefficients on the 
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interaction dummy variables for the left tail of market returns and the right tail of earnings yield are 
negative and significant at the α < 5% level indicating that smaller firms do indeed fall in value relative 
to large firms during periods of market stress, although the interpretation of these results should be 
tempered by the equivalent non significant coefficients observed for model IIb which uses the Variance 
of the Logarithm of Firm Size as the concentration metric.     
IV . CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Although some argue that capitalization weighted Indices could be more risky when 
concentration levels rise, a fall in risk is also consistent with the principles of modern portfolio theory. 
For example, conglomerate firms are portfolios of subsidiaries whose investment returns may not be 
perfectly correlated. Therefore, it is theoretically possible for all the firms in the market portfolio to 
merge into one. If such a hypothetical situation existed in an efficient market, the optimal mean variance 
efficient portfolio would contain the stock of the single firm that would, by definition, represent the 
market index portfolio.2 Without going to such hypothetical extremes, it can be argued that large 
multinational ‘mega’ firms in a concentrated stock index, such as the FTSE 100 may represent a diverse 
collection of income streams that have a low correlation with each other and with other large firms in the 
index.  
The findings of this study demonstrate that investors in the FTSE 100 Index are concentrating 
more of their assets into fewer firms than they were twenty years ago. However, by concentrating their 
assets into just a few large firms investors do not appear to have increased the risk of their portfolios 
during down markets. On the contrary, the risk adjusted return of the equally weighted portfolio, in 
which concentration is at its lower limit, is lower than that of the concentrated capitalization weighted 
portfolio.  In fact, the β sensitivity of the equally weighted portfolio to the capitalization weighted market 
proxy portfolio increases during conditions of market stress in a manner consistent with variations of the 
CAPM which allow for time varying risk premia or time varying β coefficients. Hence security market β 
coefficients estimated from regression models during periods that are predominantly good for equity 
markets may understate the true market risk that would be experienced in bad times. This study also 
explicitly tests and finds in favor of the hypothesis that concentration at the firm level increases during 
negative tail events in the return distribution, providing further evidence in support of the premise that 
smaller firms decrease in value by more than large firms during periods of market stress.  
                       
1 A proof is available from the author on request. 
2 The author is indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analogy. 
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Table 1 Concentration of the top ten firms and industries in the FTSE 100 Index in 
January 1984 and January 2005 
Panel A: Top 10 Firms and Industries in the FTSE 100 Index in January 2005 
Firm Name Weight 
Cumulative 
weight Industry Weight 
Cumulativ
e weight 
BP 10% 10% Banks 23% 23% 
HSBC Holdings 8% 18% Oil integrated 15% 37% 
Vodafone Group 7% 25% Pharmaceuticals 9% 47% 
Glaxosmithkline 6% 31% Telephone wireless 8% 55% 
Royal Bank of Scotland 5% 36% Mining 5% 60% 
Shell Transport and 
Trading. 4% 40% Food retailers 3% 63% 
Barclays 3% 43% Food producers 3% 65% 
Astrazeneca 3% 46% Tobacco 3% 68% 
HBOS 3% 49% 
Distilleries and 
Vintners 2% 70% 
Lloyds TSB Group 2% 51% 
Retailers and 
department stores 2% 72% 
Panel B: Top 10 Firms and Industries in the FTSE 100 Index at Base January 1984 
Firm Name Weight 
Cumulative 
Weight Industry Weight 
Cumulativ
e weight 
British Petroleum 7% 7% Speciality chemicals 10% 10% 
Shell Transport And 
Trading. 6% 14% Food retailers 8% 18% 
GEC (now Marconi) 5% 19% Diversified industrials 8% 25% 
Imperial Chemical 
Industries 4% 23% Banks 6% 32% 
Marks And Spencer 3% 25% Food producers 6% 38% 
British American 
Tobacco 3% 28% Insurance brokers 6% 44% 
Glaxo Holdings 3% 31% Life insurance 4% 49% 
BTR 2% 33% Tobacco 4% 53% 
Beecham Group 2% 35% Auto parts 3% 55% 
Grand Metropolitan 2% 37% Builders’ merchants 3% 58% 
Note: Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.  Firms and industries are listed in decreasing order of 
weight. Industry identifies the Thomson Financial Datastream level six industry sub-group mnemonic.  
 
Table 2 Concentration of the top ten and top decile firms and industries by capitalization in a 
global, regional and selected national market index: January 2005 
Country/Re
gion 
Index name % of value in 
top ten firms 
% of value in top 
decile of firms 
% of value in top 
ten industries 
World Dow Jones FTSE Global 
100  
88 88 98 
Europe Dow Jones FTSE Eurotop 
100  
35 35 83 
US Russell 1,000  19 57 43 
US S&P 100  40 40 43 
US Nasdaq Composite  28 61 63 
US Nasdaq 100 55 55 87 
Japan Topix 1,000 19 58 49 
Japan Topix 100 34 34 64 
UK UK Equity Market 40 83* 59 
UK FTSE 100 51 51 72 
Note: Source: Thomson Financial Datastream and for the UK Equity Market the London Stock 
Exchange Files of Listed Firms.  Industries refer to Thomson Financial Datastream Level Six Industry 
Sub-Groups.  *The UK equity market includes the ordinary shares of 990 firms listed on the UK main 
market with an equity value of greater than £1m after excluding firms listed on the alternative investment 
market (AIM) and closed ended investment companies. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics and model results of FTSE 100 Index data series observed 
over the study period: January 1984 – December 2004 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Annualised Monthly Data Series 
 µ Med Max Min σ Skew Kurt µ/σ Med/σ Max/σ Min/σ 
VWSD 15.0% 13.1% 72% 6.9% 7.3% 3.13 19 2.0 1.8 9.8 0.9 
EWSD 14.8% 12.9% 77% 6.0% 7.6% 3.31 22 2.0 1.7 10.2 0.8 
ISD 0.23% 0.25% 5.4% -5.8% 1.6% 0.01 5 0.1 0.2 3.3 -3.5 
RVW 15.1% 18.0% 318.6% -92% 17% -0.69 4 0.9 1.1 19.1 -5.5 
REW 10.8% 15.8% 301.6% -96% 18% -1.02 6 0.6 0.9 16.5 -5.2 
IR 3.9% 2.3% 145.7% -37% 4.9% 0.83 6 0.8 0.5 29.7 -7.6 
Panel B: Regression model results using Newey-West Standard Errors 
Coefficient and Variable Model I Model IIa Model IIb 
Constant  -2.1% -0.0001  0.0001 
α (-1.98)** (-1.22) (0.03) 
FTSE 100 Index Excess Return 0.94 0.01 0.05 
β (RVWt – rft) (21.19)*** (1.71)* (0.50) 
Large Negative Market Returns 0.14 -0.01  -0.17 
λ1 D1(RVWt – rft) (3.00)*** (-2.04)** (-1.40) 
High Earnings Yield 0.11 -0.01  -0.06 
λ2 D2(RVWt – rft) (2.11)*** (-1.98)** (-0.55) 
High Term Premium 0.01 -0.01  0.02 
λ3 D3(RVWt – rft) (0.17) (-1.48) (0.23) 
High Default Premium 0.02 0.001  -0.04 
λ4 D4(RVWt – rft) (0.29) (0.28) (-0.32) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.05 -0.17  -0.06 
δ(REWt-1 – rft-1) (2.65)*** (-2.95)*** (-0.89) 
Adjusted R2 0.94  0.05  0.002 
 
Note: In panel A, the acronyms VWSD, EWSD, ISD, RVW, REW and IR abbreviate the monthly – 
capitalization weighted standard deviation, equally weighted standard deviation, incremental standard 
deviation, capitalization weighted return, equally weighted return and the monthly incremental return 
respectively.  All monthly data series are estimated using twenty trading days of data as detailed in the 
text.  The number of observations for each variable in the reported sequences of non-overlapping data is 
265, µ is the mean, Med is the median, Max is the largest value, Min is the smallest, σ is the sample 
standard deviation, Skew is the skewness and Kurt is the kurtosis.  The last four columns report the 
mean, median, largest value and smallest value, respectively, divided by the standard deviation.  The 
Jarque-Bera Test Statistic rejects the null hypothesis of a normal distribution at the α < 5% level for all 
data series.  Each series is annualised based on an assumption of 253 trading days per year.  Therefore, a 
value weighted mean twenty trading-day logarithmic return of 1.1139% is annualised to 14.09% when 
multiplied by 12.65, i.e. a multiplication factor of 253/20.  This converts into a discrete geometric return 
of 15.1% per year if we take e-3.12 - 1.  Standard deviations are multiplied by the square root of 12.65.  
However, skewness and kurtosis values relate to raw monthly, i.e. not annualised data.  In panel B, 
Model I is as specified in the text, although the constant is annualized for ease of comparison with Panel 
A results. Model IIa is as specified in the text using the change in the Hirshman-Herfindahl Index as the 
concentration metric and Model IIb uses the Variance of the Logarithm of Firm Size. The t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis, where *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level 
and * significance at the 10% level.  
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Note: The level concentration metrics, sampled at twenty trading day intervals, are plotted over the entire 
study period.  In order to fit the two series onto the same chart, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index has been 
scaled up by a factor of ten, while the variance of the logarithm of firm weights remains unchanged. 
 
Figure I. Level concentration metrics (scaled) 
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Source: Office for National Statistics data.  Note: total value includes mergers between UK and foreign 
and UK and UK firms.  The % foreign refers to the proportion of UK firms acquired by, or merging with, 
foreign firms. 
Figure II. Value of mergers and divestitures involving UK firms
 
